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The Limits of Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission: Analytical and
Practical Reasons Why the Sky
Is Not Falling
By JAMES BOPP, JR.* & KAYLAN LYTLE PHILLIPS**
Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not
resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question.
—Alexis de Tocqueville1
Introduction
IN THE WAKE OF THE SUPREME COURT’S Citizens United v. Fed-
eral Election Commission2 decision, average citizens, usually blissfully un-
aware of the complexity of campaign finance law, are now confronted
by an onslaught of political rhetoric. The decision has evoked strong
criticisms, from professors3 and pundits to politicians,4 and even the
* James Bopp Jr. has a national federal and state election law practice. He is
General Counsel for the James Madison Center for Free Speech and former Co-Chairman
of the Free Speech and Election Law practice group of the Federalist Society. Mr. Bopp was
counsel for plaintiff Citizens United in the district court and prepared its jurisdictional
statement upon which the Supreme Court granted review.
** Kaylan Lytle Phillips is an Associate attorney at The Bopp Law Firm and graduate
of University of Tulsa School of Law. For her part, this Article is dedicated to her voice of
reason: Travis Phillips.
1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred
A. Knopf 1945) (1831).
2. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
3. Professor Laurence Tribe referred to the decision as “major upheaval in First
Amendment law.” Laurence Tribe, What Should Congress Do About Citizens United?,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 24, 2010, 10:30 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/what-
should-congress-do-about-citizens-united/.
4. Alan Grayson, a Democratic congressman in his first term at the time of the deci-
sion, called the decision “the worst Supreme Court decision since the Dred Scott case.”
Nick Baumann, Grayson: Court’s Campaign Finance Decision “Worst Since Dred Scott,” MOTHER
281
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President himself,5 some of whom accuse the Court of overturning a
century of safeguards from corporate interference in elections.6
To be sure, Citizens United is a landmark decision. Its significance
can be seen in the numerous scholarly publications analyzing the deci-
JONES (Jan. 22, 2010, 5:00 AM), http://motherjones.com/mojo/2010/01/grayson-courts-
campaign-finance-decision-worst-dredd-scott. Russ Feingold, former U.S. Senator from Wis-
consin and co-author of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act that the case, in part, chal-
lenged, called the decision a “terrible mistake.” Kasie Hunt, John McCain, Russ Feingold
Diverge on Court Ruling, POLITICO (Jan. 21, 2010, 12:45 PM), http://www.politico.com/
news/stories/0110/31810.html. Ralph Nader, four-time Green Party candidate for Presi-
dent, stated that the decision “shreds the fabric of our already weakened democracy by
allowing corporations to more completely dominate our corrupted electoral process.”
Ralph Nader, The Supremes Bow to King Corporation, COUNTERPUNCH (Jan. 22, 2010), http://
www.counterpunch.org/2010/01/22/the-supremes-bow-to-king-corporation/.
5. It is unusual for any lawyer to openly criticize a judge, let alone for the President
to arguably scold the highest Court in the United States in such a public way, during the
President’s annual monopolization of the airwaves, no less. Specifically, the President
stated:
With all due deference to separation of powers, last week the Supreme Court
reversed a century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for special inter-
ests—including foreign corporations—to spend without limit in our elections. I
don’t think American elections should be bankrolled by America’s most powerful
interests, or worse, by foreign entities. They should be decided by the American
people. And I’d urge Democrats and Republicans to pass a bill that helps to cor-
rect some of these problems.
156 Cong. Rec. H414, H418 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2010) (State of the Union Address by Presi-
dent Barack Obama). During this portion of the speech, television cameras caught Justice
Samuel Alito mouthing the words “not true” in response to the President. Ben Fruman,
Alito Appears to Mouth ‘Definitely Not True’ After Obama Criticizes Court Decision, TPMLIVEWIRE
(Jan. 27, 2010, 10:40 PM), http://tpmlivewire.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/01/alito-ap-
pears-to-mouth-definitely-not-true-after-obama-criticizes-court-decision.php. Justice Alito is
correct. First, regarding the “century of law,” perhaps President Obama was referring to
the Tillman Act that was passed in 1907. But that Act banned corporations from making
direct contributions to federal candidates. See Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, ch.
420, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)). The Citizens United
decision addressed corporate independent expenditures, not contributions. Congress did
pass a ban on corporate independent expenditures in 1947 and the electioneering com-
munication ban examined by the Citizens United Court was only enacted in 2002. See Hans
von Spakovsky, The Truth about President Obama and Citizens United, FOUNDRY HERITAGE
BLOG (Jan. 28, 2010, 6:24 PM), http://blog.heritage.org/2010/01/28/the-truth-about-
president-obama-and-citizens-united/. Or, perhaps, the President was paraphrasing a sen-
tence in Justice Stevens’s dissent: “The Court today rejects a century of history when it
treats the distinction between corporate and individual campaign spending as an invidious
novelty born of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 930
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)); see also William G. Ross, Constructive Criticism: Presidential
Opposition to Supreme Court Rulings, JURIST (Feb. 2, 2010), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/
forumy/2010/02/constructive-criticism-presidential.php. Either way, the President’s reac-
tionary statement was not suited for the occasion.
6. See, e.g., 156 Cong. Rec. H414 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2010).
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sion.7 However, the myths about Citizens United are as widespread as
the criticism. This Article will first shine light8 on the foundation for
Citizens United and then consider what the decision actually did, and
(perhaps more importantly) what it did not do, including the practi-
cal and analytical limits to its holding, as well as several issues the
Court did not address. This Article will also consider the arguments
from the critics of Citizens United, in light of evidence from the 2010
election, and show that these criticisms are fallacious and misplaced.
I. The Foundation for Citizens United’s Holding
One cannot examine Citizens United in a vacuum. The case may be
a landmark but the issue of protecting political speech is not novel.
However, the amount of protection given to this essential freedom
varies based on the political climate of the time. While the speech-
protective holding of Citizens United signifies another move toward
fierce protection of political speech, the harsh criticism of the deci-
sion looms ominously and distracts from the core issues at stake. But
before understanding what Citizens United did and what the criticism
(much of it unfounded) means for the future of political expression,
one must first understand the history and purpose of the First Amend-
ment. Next, it is important to consider the legislative progression of
campaign finance reform. Finally, one must examine several key Su-
preme Court cases that laid the foundation for Citizens United.
A. The Exposition: “Congress Shall Make No Law”
The Founding Fathers debated whether the Constitution needed
a Bill of Rights. The opponents were the Federalists, who believed that
the Bill of Rights was either (1) superfluous, as the rights were so obvi-
7. Among the many publications regarding Citizens United are three law review arti-
cles co-written by Author Bopp. See James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission: “Precisely What WRTL Sought to Avoid,” 2010 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 29 [hereinafter Bopp & Coleson]; James Bopp, Jr., Joseph E. La Rue & Elizabeth M.
Kosel, The Game Changer: Citizen United’s Impact on Campaign Finance Law in General and
Corporate Political Speech in Particular, 9 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 251 (2011) [hereinafter
Bopp, La Rue & Kosel]; James Bopp, Jr. & Jared Haynie, The Tyranny of “Reform and Trans-
parency”: A Plea to the Supreme Court to Revisit and Overturn Citizens United’s “Disclaimer and
Disclosure” Holding, 16 NEXUS CHAP. J.L. & POL’Y 3 (2011) [hereinafter Bopp & Haynie]. To
avoid repetitiveness yet be comprehensive, this Article may cover similar points but will
cross-reference the earlier-published articles when possible for further discussion.
8. After all (to use an oft-quoted term from many Citizens United critics), “[s]unlight
is said to be the best of disinfectants.” This phrase was coined by Justice Louis Brandeis.
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 92, 92 (1914), available
at http://www.law.louisville.edu/library/collections/brandeis/node/196.
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ous that enumerating them would prove to be a hindrance by limiting
people to just what was written; or (2) something that should be left to
the states to implement, if such enumeration were necessary.9 The
anti-Federalists fought for the Bill of Rights, believing the rights were
too important not to protect them proactively.10 Thomas Jefferson,
when urging James Madison to consider the addition, described the
Bill of Rights as “what the people are entitled to against every govern-
ment on earth . . . and what no just government should refuse, or rest
on inference.”11 Madison was persuaded and even advocated for the
Bill of Rights before Congress.12
In ratifying the Bill of Rights, the Founding Fathers drew a clear
distinction between the new democracy and the old English monar-
chy. Such a statement of basic entitlements was a significant departure
from the monarchical mindset because it signaled the need to control
the government by proactively giving authority to the people. Notably,
the Bill of Rights begins by admonishing the government about its
obligations. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”13 The
placement of the rights mentioned in the First Amendment is no acci-
dent; freedom of speech, press, assembly,14 and petition15 are essen-
tial to the establishment of a self-governing society.16
9. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 22, 1925), in 2 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 327, 329 (H.A. Washington, ed., 1859) [hereinafter Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison] (setting forth the arguments of the Federalists).
The first fear was addressed by the Ninth Amendment: “The enumeration in the Constitu-
tion, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.” U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
10. See, e.g., Letters from the Federal Farmer, Letter II (Oct. 9, 1787), reprinted in
EMPIRE AND NATION 98, 100 (1962) (“There are certain inalienable and fundamental
rights, which . . . ought to be explicitly ascertained and fixed . . . These rights should be
made the basis of every constitution . . . .”).
11. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 9, at 330.
12. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439–41 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
14. “Assemble” has been interpreted to mean the freedom to associate. See infra Part
I.C.1. The most common way for people to associate today is through a corporation, labor
union, or political party. As will be explained infra Part III.B, targeting corporations for
restrictions hurts people of average means more than the wealthy.
15. The right to petition, or lobby, the government is “cut from the same cloth as the
other guarantees of that Amendment, and is an assurance of a particular freedom of ex-
pression . . . . James Madison made clear in the congressional debate on the proposed
amendment that people ‘may communicate their will’ through direct petitions to the legis-
lature and government officials.” McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985).
16. “The First Amendment, in particular, serves significant societal interests.” First
Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
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It is also no accident that the Founders guaranteed these essential
rights by depriving the government of the ability to infringe. In so doing,
the First Amendment protects these freedoms, rather than conferring
certain rights.17 Freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition go
to the nature of the country itself and why the country was founded.18
This is important because the question of protecting the freedom of
speech does not turn on who the speaker is but on the protection of
the freedom itself.19
In the age-old struggle between the people and the government,
the First Amendment is the lynchpin of the United States’s self-gov-
erning society. It empowers the people to maintain control over the
government and not the other way around. Unfortunately, the battle
to ratify the Bill of Rights was only the first of many struggles the First
Amendment would endure.
B. Rising Action: Congress Chooses to Make Laws
The admonition that “Congress shall make no law” directly con-
flicts with a politician’s desire for self-preservation. “The first instinct
of power is the retention of power . . . .”20 Nowhere is this maxim
more evident than in regulations restricting political speech. Laws to
“promote the integrity of elections” are passed, sometimes in blatant
disregard for the Constitution, by politicians fearful of the power of
criticism.21 This is demonstrated by Congress’ passage of the Alien
and Sedition Acts, the Tillman Act, the Federal Election Campaign
Act (“FECA”), and most recently, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act (“BCRA”).22
17. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“[T]he right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.”); U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated . . . .”).
18. See Bopp & Haynie, supra note 7, at 7–10.
19. The issue of “corporate personhood” frequently comes up in debates over Citizens
United. But, as stated above, the First Amendment provides the freedom of speech, regard-
less of the identity of the speaker. For a more in-depth analysis of the history of corporate
personhood, see Bopp, La Rue & Kosel, supra note 7, at 257–59.
20. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 263 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
21. See Bopp & Haynie, supra note 7, at 10–14 (explaining that most legislatures urge
campaign finance reform as means of curtailing “negative attack ads” but, in reality, it is to
protect them from criticism).
22. BCRA will be discussed infra Part I.C.2.
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1. The Alien and Sedition Acts: A Reactionary Response
The ink was not yet dry on the Bill of Rights when the govern-
ment passed the first significant infringement of the First Amend-
ment. The Alien and Sedition Acts,23 passed a mere seven years after
the Bill of Rights was ratified, were born out of the Federalist-con-
trolled Congress’24 fear of Democratic-Republican criticism during a
season of political uncertainty.25 The Alien and Sedition Acts, in part,
made it illegal to publish “any false, scandalous and malicious writ-
ing[s] . . . with the intent to defame” the government, “or to stir up
sedition within the United States . . . .”26
Many people were penalized for violating these Acts.27 Ironically,
the Federalists’ prosecution of dissenters under the Acts only led to
more criticism, and the party was defeated in the next election.28 The
Sedition Act “first crystallized a national awareness of the central
meaning of the First Amendment.”29 Significantly, “malicious false-
hoods about the Vice President—Thomas Jefferson, who was a lead-
ing Republican” were exempt and the Sedition Act conveniently
expired “the day before Federalist President John Adams’s term was to
end,” demonstrating that the law’s purpose was to silence criticism.30
23. Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801). The Acts were
comprised of four parts. The relevant part here was “An Act for the Punishment of Certain
Crimes against the United States,” commonly known as the Sedition Act, the full text of
which can be found at An Act in Addition to the Act, Entitled “An Act for the Punishment of
Certain Crimes Against the United States, YALE L. SCH., http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_cen-
tury/sedact.asp (last visited Dec. 7, 2011).
24. At the time, “[t]he Federalist Party controlled all three branches of the federal
government.” Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and of the Press, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO
THE CONSTITUTION 312 (Edwin Meese III et al. eds., 2005).
25. See The Formation of Political Parties: The Alien and Sedition Acts, NAT’L ARCHIVES &
RECORDS ADMIN., http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/treasures_of_congress/text/page5_
text.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2011). The other three laws related to residency and deporta-
tion of non-citizens and, like the Sedition Act, had paternalistic motives relating to a dis-
trust of an alien’s loyalty. The Sedition Act was targeted at the Democratic-Republicans as
“the party typically favored by new citizens.” Id.
26. Alien and Sedition Acts of 1978, 1 Stat. 596. The crime was punishable by up to a
$5000 fine and up to five years in prison. Id.
27. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 63–64 (2004).
28. See The Formation of Political Parties: The Alien and Sedition Acts, supra note 25.
29. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964).
30. Volokh, supra note 24, at 312.
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Thomas Jefferson and James Madison vehemently opposed the
Acts.31 They appealed to the people, who responded by passing reso-
lutions, such as the Virginia Resolution of 1798, which stated:
That the General Assembly doth particularly protest against the
palpable and alarming infractions of the Constitution . . . ; [the
Sedition Act], exercises . . . a power not delegated by the constitu-
tion, but on the contrary, expressly and positively forbidden by one
of the amendments thereto; a power, which more than any other,
ought to produce universal alarm, because it is levelled against the
right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of
free communication among the people thereon, which has ever
been justly deemed, the only effectual guardian of every other
right.32
Nevertheless, Democratic-Republican candidate Thomas Jeffer-
son beat out Federalist John Adams in the 1800 election.33 President
Jefferson pardoned all of those still serving sentences for violating the
Sedition Act.34 Later, Congress denounced the Sedition Act as uncon-
stitutional and refunded the fines that had been levied under it.35
Since then, courts have assumed the Act to be invalid “because of the
restraint it imposed upon criticism of government and public officials,
31. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794) (“If we advert to the nature of Republican
Government, we shall find that the censorial power is in the people over the Government,
and not in the Government over the people.” (summary of remarks by James Madison)).
32. Virginia Resolution of 1798 (Dec. 21, 1798), reprinted in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES ON
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528, 528–29 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1907), available at
http://www.constitution.org/cons/virg1798.htm.
33. Presidential Election of 1800: A Resource Guide, LIBRARY CONG, http://www.loc.gov/
rr/program/bib/elections/election1800.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2011).
34. “I discharged every person under punishment or prosecution under the Sedition
law, because I considered, and now consider, that law to be a nullity, as absolute and as
palpable as if Congress had ordered us to fall down and worship a golden image . . . .”
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. John Adams (July 22, 1804), in THE JEFFERSONIAN
CYCLOPEDIA 988, 988–89 (John P. Foley ed., 1900). There are many stories of people who
violated the Sedition Act that border on the absurd. One of the most absurd examples is
that of David Brown, who was a “vagabond radical who wandered from town to town
preaching the evils of the Federalist government.” STONE, supra note 27, at 64. A group,
merely inspired by Brown, set up a pole with the words: “No Stamp Act, No Sedition Act, No
Alien Bills, No Land Tax, downfall to the Tyrants of America; peace and retirement to the
President; Long Live the Vice-President.” Id. The Federalists chopped down the pole and
embarked on a man-hunt for Brown. Id. Brown was arrested and pled guilty but Justice
Samuel Chase wanted the names of any accomplices. Id. Because he refused, Justice “Chase
sentenced Brown to a fine of $450 and eighteen months in prison.” Id. Even worse, be-
cause he could not afford to pay his fine, he was forced to remain in prison for even
longer. Id. at n.*.
35. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) (citing Act of July 4, 1840, ch.
45, 6 Stat. 802 and H.R. REP. NO. 26-86 (1840)).
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was inconsistent with the First Amendment.”36 The First Amendment
was victorious.
2. The Domino Effect: From Tillman to FECA
A hundred years later, newly elected President Theodore
Roosevelt was confronted by criticism about corporate contributions
to his and other Republican campaigns.37 Roosevelt responded by
urging Congress to ban such contributions altogether.38 Democratic
Senator Benjamin Tillman heard the call.39 The Tillman Act, passed
in 1907, banned all corporate contributions.40 While the Tillman Act
may seem like a small encroachment on political speech,41 it marked
36. Id.
37. See Melvin I. Urofsky, Campaign Finance Reform Before 1971, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1,
14–15 (2008) (“Although everyone knew that corporations gave money to political cam-
paigns, the investigation detailed how much had gone to the Republican Party, and sud-
denly the idea of corporate contributions became scandalous and a menace to
democracy.”).
38. Specifically, President Roosevelt urged that:
All contributions by corporations to any political committee or for any political
purpose should be forbidden by law; directors should not be permitted to use
stockholders’ money for such purposes; and, moreover, a prohibition of this kind
would be, as far as it went, an effective method of stopping the evils aimed at in
corrupt practices acts. Not only should both the National and the several State
legislatures forbid any officer of a corporation from using the money of the cor-
poration in or about any election, but they should also forbid such use of money
in connection with any legislation save by the employment of counsel in public
manner for distinctly legal services.
40 CONG. REC. 96 (1906); see also United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 572 (1957) (explain-
ing the historical background of the corporate contribution ban).
39. Senator Tillman is also known for being violent, offensive, and racist. He was one
of the architects of the Jim Crow laws in South Carolina. See Urofsky, supra note 37, at 16;
see also Brad Smith, Ben Tillman: Forgotten Founding Father of “Reform,” CENTER COMPETITIVE
POL. BLOG (Dec. 1, 2006), http://www.campaignfreedom.org/blog/ID.124/blog_detail.
asp. Senator Tillman did not hide his feeling towards the general populace, poignantly
saying, “I have come to doubt that the masses of the people have sense enough to govern
themselves.” Id.
40. Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended
at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)). The Act stated that “[i]t shall also be unlawful for any corpora-
tion whatever to make a money contribution in connection with any election at which
Presidential and Vice-Presidential electors or a Representative in Congress is to be voted
for or any election by any State legislature of a United States Senator.” Id. Violations re-
sulted in a fine against the corporation and a fine or jail sentence for any involved officers,
or, in the discretion of the court, both a fine and jail sentence, if the officers consented to
contributions in violation of the provisions. Id.
41. “Our pursuit of other governmental ends, however, may tempt us to accept in
small increments a loss that would be unthinkable if inflicted all at once. For this reason,
we must be as vigilant against the modest diminution of speech as we are against its sweep-
ing restriction.” FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 264–65 (1986).
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the beginning of a long line of restrictions under the guise of “re-
form” and “clean government.”
In the wake of the First and Second World Wars and during the
uncertainty at the beginning of the Cold War, labor organizations be-
came formidable entities, often threatening or carrying out long-last-
ing strikes. Two Republicans, Senator Robert Taft and Representative
Fred A. Hartley, Jr., sponsored legislation to, among other things, ban
“unfair labor practices.”42 Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act in
1947.43 In addition to regulating strikes and internal leadership, it
“was the first law barring unions and corporations from making inde-
pendent expenditures in support of or opposition to federal candi-
dates.”44 The Act passed over President Truman’s adamant veto.45
As the country grew, so did the stakes in obtaining and retaining
political office, and with that, a fear of “undue influence” in the politi-
cal process. New media technology changed the way campaigns were
run and, in turn, allowed more citizens to see and be solicited by indi-
vidual candidates.46 Because they were able to reach more people,
politicians began campaigning constantly.47 The increased campaign-
ing brought with it an increase of scandal. Notably, even before Water-
42. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 8,
61 Stat. 136, 140.
43. 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (2006). Congress stated that it passed the Act:
[I]n order to promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate
rights of both employees and employers in their relations affecting commerce, to
provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by ei-
ther with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect the rights of individual
employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect com-
merce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management
which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the
rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce.
Id.
44. Floyd Abrams & Burt Neuborne, Debating ‘Citizens United,’ NATION, Jan. 31, 2011,
available at http://www.thenation.com/article/157720/debating-citizens-united (last vis-
ited Dec. 7, 2011); see also Urofsky, supra note 37, at 27 (“Taft-Hartley not only attempted to
regulate the use of money, but also for the first time overtly tried to limit political speech
by a particular group.”).
45. Harry S. Truman, Veto of the Taft-Hartley Labor Bill, 1947 PUB. PAPERS 288, 297
Note (June 20, 1947). President Truman, in relevant part, stated that the legislation:
[W]ould prohibit many legitimate activities on the part of unions and corpora-
tions . . . [and] would prevent the ordinary union newspaper from commenting
favorably or unfavorably upon candidates or issues in national elections. I regard
this as a dangerous intrusion on free speech, unwarranted by any demonstration
of need, and quite foreign to the stated purposes of this bill.
Id. at 296.
46. Urofsky, supra note 37, at 31–32.
47. Id. at 32.
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gate, then-Senator and Vice Presidential candidate Richard Nixon
dealt with accusations of “personal favors.”48 Congress again decided
to make laws regulating political speech in order to preserve “the in-
tegrity of our electoral process.”49 In 1971, Congress passed an expan-
sive campaign reform act known as the Federal Election Campaign
Act (“FECA”).50 Among other things, this Act required full reporting
of campaign contributions51 and expenditures,52 laid the foundation
for corporate separate segregated funds,53 and limited spending on
media advertisements.
The first election after FECA was implemented happened to be
rife with political scandal. President Nixon’s involvement in, and sub-
sequent cover-up of, the Watergate scandal, crimes having “little or
nothing to do with campaign financing,”54 led Congress to pass sub-
48. Then-Vice-Presidential candidate Nixon addressed the concerns in his famous
“Checkers Speech.” See David LaGesse, The 1952 Checkers Speech: The Dog Carries the Day for
Richard Nixon, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 17, 2008), http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/
2008/01/17/the-dog-carries-the-day-for-nixon.
49. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 424
U.S. 1 (1976), modified, 532 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (quoting United States v. UAW, 352
U.S. 567, 570 (1957)).
50. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
51. “Contribution” includes:
(i) any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value
made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal of-
fice; or (ii) the payment by any person of compensation for the personal services
of another person which are rendered to a political committee without charge for
any purpose.
2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A) (2006).
52. “Expenditure” includes: (i) any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance,
deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of
influencing any election for Federal office; and (ii) a written contract, promise, or agree-
ment to make an expenditure. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A).
53. A “separate segregated fund” is “commonly known as a ‘PAC.’” FEC v. Wis. Right
to Life, Inc. (WRTL-II), 551 U.S. 449, 485 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment). According to the FEC:
The term “political action committee” (PAC) refers to two distinct types of politi-
cal committees registered with the FEC: separate segregated funds (SSFs) and
nonconnected committees. Basically, SSFs are political committees established
and administered by corporations, labor unions, membership organizations or
trade associations. These committees can only solicit contributions from individu-
als associated with connected or sponsoring organization. By contrast, noncon-
nected committees—as their name suggests—are not sponsored by or connected
to any of the aforementioned entities and are free to solicit contributions from
the general public.
Quick Answers to PAC Questions, FEC, http://www.fec.gov/ans/answers_pac.shtml (last vis-
ited Dec. 7, 2011).
54. Urofsky, supra note 37, at 55.
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stantive amendments to FECA in 1974.55 These amendments also cre-
ated the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) to oversee the
administration of the Act, and set limits on candidate and political
committee contributions and expenditures.56
C. Rising Action, Continued: Courts Scrutinize Congress’ Laws
Buckley v. Valeo, the seminal campaign finance case, involved a
constitutional challenge to FECA.57 The challengers sought in district
court declaratory and injunctive relief against several provisions of the
new campaign-finance regulations.58 The Court of Appeals,59 acknowl-
edging the First Amendment concerns implicated by the passage of
FECA, stated that the case “raises issues not less than basic to a demo-
cratic society.”60 However, the Court of Appeals’ opinion appeared to
have been influenced by “the shock waves of momentous revelations
concerning events of the last Presidential campaign”61 and a deep
concern about the “alarming” increase of money spent on federal
election campaigns, rather than by the root obligation to protect polit-
ical speech.62 Reviewing the challenged regulations under constitu-
55. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263 (codified as amended in various sections of the U.S. Code). There were also signifi-
cant changes in Congress as a result of the election following Watergate, with the Demo-
crats gaining four seats in the Senate and forty-nine in the House. CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, STATISTICS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 4, 1974, at 46
(1975), available at http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1974election.pdf.
56. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–455.
57. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6 (1976).
58. Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1975). Plaintiffs asked for expedited
relief under a special provision of FECA, 2 U.S.C. § 437h, so the district court’s role was
limited. Id.
59. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 424 U.S.
1 (1976), modified, 532 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
60. Id. at 835 (quoting United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957)).
61. Id. The Supreme Court was also influenced by “deeply disturbing examples surfac-
ing after the 1972 election.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 27.
62. Buckley, 519 F.2d at 837 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The escalation of the 1972 election and the shock of its aftermath led to a call for
comprehensive corrective measures. Congress found that federal election cam-
paigns have become enormously expensive, with costs increasing at an “alarming”
rate. An estimated $400 million was spent in 1972 for nomination and election
campaigns— almost a 300% increase since 1952, in a period when the consumer
price index rose 57.6%. In 1972, Presidential campaign spending alone totaled
$94.4 million—up 67 percent from $56.4 million in 1968; up 147 percent from
$38.1 million in 1964; and up 247 percent from $27.2 million in 1960.
Id.
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tional scrutiny, the Court of Appeals held that the key provisions of
FECA were justified.63
The challengers appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.64
The Court struck down the limitations on campaign expenditures, in-
dependent expenditures, and expenditures from a candidate’s per-
sonal funds.65 This decision set the tone for judicial review of
campaign finance reform. Buckley’s standards still inform and influ-
ence campaign finance law today.
1. Buckley: The Supreme Court Protects Speech
Buckley affirmed that “[t]he First Amendment protects political
association as well as political expression.”66 The right of association
“is diluted if it does not include the right to pool money through con-
tributions, for funds are often essential if ‘advocacy’ is to be truly or
optimally ‘effective.’”67 Therefore, FECA’s limitations “impinge on
protected associational freedoms.”68 While the Court found that both
the restrictions on expenditures and on contributions “implicate fun-
damental First Amendment interests,” it found that “expenditure ceil-
63. Id. at 851–59, 861–62, 865, 868–70.
64. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7.
The statutes at issue summarized in broad terms, contain the following provisions:
(a) individual political contributions are limited to $1,000 to any single candidate
per election, with an overall annual limitation of $25,000 by any contributor; in-
dependent expenditures by individuals and groups “relative to a clearly identified
candidate” are limited to $1,000 a year; campaign spending by candidates for
various federal offices and spending for national conventions by political parties
are subject to prescribed limits; (b) contributions and expenditures above certain
threshold levels must be reported and publicly disclosed; (c) a system for public
funding of Presidential campaign activities is established by Subtitle H of the In-
ternal Revenue Code; and (d) a Federal Election Commission is established to
administer and enforce the legislation.
Id.
65. Id. at 143. The Supreme Court stated that independent expenditures are “com-
munications containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as ‘vote for,’
‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘re-
ject.’” Id. at 44 n.52.
66. Id. at 15.
The constitutional right of association explicated in NAACP v. Alabama stemmed
from the Court’s recognition that “[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private
points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group
association.” Subsequent decisions have made clear that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee “‘freedom to associate with others for the common ad-
vancement of political beliefs and ideas,’” a freedom that encompasses “‘[t]he
right to associate with the political party of one’s choice.’”
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 65–66.
68. Id. at 22.
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ings impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected
freedoms of political expression and association” than the restrictions
on contributions.69
Restrictions on expenditures are especially problematic “because
virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society
requires the expenditure of money.”70 Limiting the amount an indi-
vidual or group may expend on a communication “necessarily reduces
the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues dis-
cussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached.”71
Regarding limits on contributions, the Court noted that they “op-
erate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities”
because “[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications
of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of govern-
ment established by our Constitution.”72 But the Court said that con-
tribution limits “entail[ ] only a marginal restriction upon the
contributor’s ability to engage in free [speech].”73 This is because the
“contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candi-
date and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for
that support.”74 According to the Court, limits on contributions still
allow contributors to associate with, and speak their support for, can-
didates.75 The Court subjected the challenged contribution limits to
constitutional scrutiny, which it held they passed.76
The Buckley Court also set the ground rules for what groups may
be treated as political committees under FECA. Only groups that are
“under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is
the nomination or election of a candidate” may be regulated as politi-
cal committees.77 Commonly known as the “major purpose test,” this
69. Id. at 23.
70. Id. at 19.
71. Id. at 19. “The electorate’s increasing dependence on television, radio, and other
mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes of communication
indispensable instruments of effective political speech.” Id.
72. Id. at 14.
73. Id. at 20.
74. Id. at 21.
75. Id. at 22.
76. Id. at 29.
77. Id. at 79. Whether an entity meets the major purpose test depends on either its
“central organizational purpose” or its “independent spending.” MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 252
n.6, 262 (1986).
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protects individuals and groups temporarily engaging in political
speech from being subjected to permanent burdens.78
2. BCRA: Congress Makes Law, Again
After Buckley, Congress made several other amendments to FECA,
primarily implementing the Supreme Court’s direction and other
changes to campaign finance regulations.79 However, the most sweep-
ing changes to the nation’s campaign finance scheme came when
Congress passed a series of amendments to FECA in the form of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”).80 Senators John
McCain and Russ Feingold heralded the need for reform in order to
stop “sham issue ads” that allowed undue influence in elections.81 The
crux of BCRA is to address two issues: (1) the role of “soft money”82 in
campaigns; and (2) the role of “issue ads”83 near an election. To ad-
dress these issues, BCRA: (1) prohibited political parties from raising
78. The “major purpose test” has been recognized by various courts and the FEC. See
Political Committee Status, Definition of Contribution, and Allocation for Separate Segre-
gated Funds and Nonconnected Committees, 69 Fed. Reg. 68,064 (Nov. 23, 2004) (to be
codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100) (“Nearly three decades ago, the Supreme Court narrowed . . .
‘political committee’ . . . to . . . organizations . . . the major purpose of which is the nomi-
nation or election of a candidate.” (citation omitted)); Express Advocacy, Independent
Expenditures, Corporate and Labor Organization Expenditures, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,292,
35,303–04 (July 6, 1995) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100).
79. Appendix 4: Brief History, FEC, http://www.fec.gov/info/appfour.htm (last visited
Dec. 7, 2011).
80. BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (also referred to as the McCain-
Feingold Act). For more in-depth discussion of the origins of BCRA, please see James
Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, The First Amendment Needs No Reform: Protecting Liberty from
Campaign Finance “Reformers,” 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 785, 796–97 (2002) (discussion of how
McCain-Feingold benefits wealthy individuals and incumbent politicians).
81. See James Bopp, Jr., Silencing Criticism, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Apr. 24, 2007, 6:00
AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/220712/silencing-criticism/james-bopp-jr?
page=1. “The calls to ‘stop the wealthy’ from influencing government policy were actually
generated by $140 million in grants from wealthy foundations like Pew: $123 million came
from just eight foundations, and $104 million went to just 17 ‘campaign finance reform’
organizations.” Id.
82. “Soft money” consists of:
Donations made solely for the purpose of influencing state or local elections[,
which] are therefore unaffected by FECA’s requirements and prohibitions. As a
result, prior to the enactment of BCRA, federal law permitted corporations and
unions, as well as individuals who had already made the maximum permissible
contributions to federal candidates, to contribute “nonfederal money”—also
known as “soft money”—to political parties for activities intended to influence
state or local elections.
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 122–23 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.
Ct. 876 (2010).
83. “Issue ads” are ads that were not regulated as express advocacy because, “even if
the ads mentioned the name of a federal candidate . . . they did not expressly advocate the
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or spending any non-federal funds; and (2) created a category of
speech called “electioneering communications,” for which it estab-
lished regulations.84
Just as Buckley’s constitutional challenge followed closely on the
heels of the passage of FECA, the constitutionality of BCRA was chal-
lenged almost immediately in McConnell v. Federal Election Commis-
sion.85 But where Buckley recognized the First Amendment problems
inherent in the regulations, McConnell upheld the challenged provi-
sions on their face.86
D. The Climax: Wisconsin Right to Life Challenges BCRA
Regulations
McConnell dealt a serious blow to the First Amendment. However,
because it was a facial holding, there remained opportunities for as-
applied challenges to BCRA’s regulations. Such a challenge came
before the Court in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life
(“WRTL-II”).87 While McConnell held the corporate electioneering
candidate’s election or defeat.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 123–24, overruled by Citizens United,
130 S. Ct. 876 (citation omitted).
84. Electioneering communications include “any broadcast, cable, or satellite commu-
nication that refers to a candidate for federal office and that is aired within 30 days of a
federal primary election or 60 days of a federal general election in the jurisdiction in which
that candidate is running for office.” WRTL-II, 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007) (controlling opin-
ion by Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito, J.) (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006)). Election-
eering communication regulations were troubling since they would sweep in grassroots
lobbying regarding important issues that just happened to be up for debate near an
election.
85. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
86. For more information on the Supreme Court’s decision in McConnell, see James
Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, The First Amendment Is Still Not a Loophole: Examining Mc-
Connell’s Exception to Buckley’s General Rule Protecting Issue Advocacy, 31 N. KY. L. REV. 289,
333–40 (2004). Relevant to the discussion at hand, the article explains that “[e]ven though
McConnell declared that the express advocacy test is not compelled by the Constitution, it
nonetheless required that there be something functionally equivalent to the express advo-
cacy test if the express advocacy test is not employed to analyze statutes for constitutional-
ity.” Id. at 291.
87. WRTL-II, 551 U.S. 449; see also Bopp & Coleson, supra note 7, at Part III; Bopp, La
Rue & Kosel, supra note 7, at 313. WRTL went before the Supreme Court twice for this
controversy. The first time was on the procedural issue of whether such an as-applied chal-
lenge was permissible. The Supreme Court agreed that such a challenge was permissible
and sent the case back to the district court. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC (WRTL-I), 546
U.S. 410 (2006) (per curiam). The district court then ruled in WRTL’s favor, Wis. Right to
Life, Inc. v. FEC, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.D.C. 2006), and the FEC appealed.
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communications ban constitutional on its face,88 WRTL-II questioned
whether the ban was constitutional as applied to issue advocacy.89
In 2004, Wisconsin Right to Life (“WRTL”), an ideological corpo-
ration, wanted to lobby to stop Congress from filibustering President
George W. Bush’s judicial nominees.90 The group created broadcast
ads urging citizens to ask the Wisconsin Senators (Senators Herb Kohl
and Russ Feingold) to oppose the filibusters.91 However, Senator Fein-
gold was a candidate in the November 2004 election.92 Under the cor-
porate electioneering-communication ban, WRTL could not
broadcast its ads thirty days before the primary or sixty days before the
general election.93 In Wisconsin, this meant that it could not broad-
cast its ads from August 15 until after the general election in Novem-
ber.94 The fact that WRTL’s issue ads had nothing to do with the
election was inconsequential under the ban.95
The Supreme Court got a chance in WRTL-II to resuscitate the
First Amendment after the blows it suffered in McConnell. The Court
brought the focus back to the First Amendment96 and made it clear
that “benefit of the doubt” should go to free speech.97 The Court re-
jected consideration of speech’s “intent and effect,”98 context,99 or its
proximity to the election,100 and instead reviewed the regulations in
an objective and substantive manner.101
The Supreme Court created a test to protect issue advocacy.
Under the newly-minted “appeal to vote” test, an ad satisfies McCon-
nell’s “functional equivalent of express advocacy” test102 and is sub-
jected to the corporate prohibition only if it “is susceptible of no
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or
88. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204–06.
89. WRTL-II, 551 U.S. at 456.
90. Id. at 458–59.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 464.
93. Id. at 457–58.
94. Id. at 460.
95. See id. at 465–69.
96. Id. at 481–82.
97. Id. at 474 n.7, 482.
98. Id. at 461–65 (rejecting the consideration of intent and effect in the context of as-
applied challenges).
99. Id. at 471–73 (stating that “contextual factors . . . should seldom play a significant
role in the inquiry”).
100. Id. at 472–73.
101. Id. at 469.
102. See supra note 86.
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against a specific candidate.”103 This carved out a broad exception to
the electioneering communication ban. Even so, three Justices wanted
to go further.104 But the author of the controlling opinion, Chief Jus-
tice Roberts (joined by Justice Alito), decided on a constrained, nar-
row holding in order to salvage McConnell.105
However, the Court’s narrow ruling in WRTL-II did not work. Fol-
lowing WRTL-II, the FEC turned the Court’s simple test into a “two-
part, 11-factor balancing test.”106 The Court repudiated this, stating
that the First Amendment is “[p]remised on mistrust of government
power”107 and that “the FEC’s ‘business is to censor.’”108 The FEC was
not equipped to champion the First Amendment. In practice, the FEC
believed its authority to be plenary109 and, as a result of the FEC pass-
ing extensive regulations pursuant to this apparent authority, citizens
were at a loss as to when they were permitted to speak. But “[t]he First
Amendment does not permit laws that force speakers to retain a cam-
paign finance attorney . . . or seek declaratory rulings before discuss-
ing the most salient political issues of our day.”110 However, after the
Court’s narrow ruling in WRTL-II and the FEC’s interpretation of that
ruling, that is exactly what was required.
II. The Reality of Citizens United
Citizens United is a nonprofit corporation that wished to dis-
tribute a movie about then-Senator Hillary Clinton in various medi-
ums, including theaters, video-on-demand broadcasts, and DVD
sales.111 The organization also wanted to make and distribute two ten-
second and one thirty-second advertisements for the film.112 Because
Clinton was a presidential candidate, the distribution of the film and
103. Id. at 469–70.
104. See id. at 483–504 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment,
joined by Kennedy, J. and Thomas, J.).
105. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 7, at 34.
106. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 895 (2010); see also Bopp & Coleson, supra
note 7, at 39, 51.
107. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 882.
108. Id. at 896 (quoting Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57–58 (1965)).
109. The Solicitor General even admitted, much to everyone’s shock, that the govern-
ment thought it had the power to ban books. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 65, Citi-
zens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205), available at http://www.supreme
court.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-205%5BReargued%5D.pdf (last vis-
ited Dec. 7, 2011); see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904.
110. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 889 (“People ‘of common intelligence must necessa-
rily guess at [the law’s] meaning and differ as to its application.’” (alteration in original)).
111. Id. at 886–87.
112. Id.
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the advertisements would fall into the applicable electioneering-com-
munication window.113 Citizens United sought relief, contending that
the movie and the advertisements did not meet WRTL-II’s appeal-to-
vote test.114 The Supreme Court’s handling and disposition of Citizens
United has been analyzed in many ways. In short, the decision did two
significant things: (1) it struck down the federal ban on corporate in-
dependent expenditures and electioneering communications,115 over-
ruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce116 and portions of
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission;117 and (2) it took away any
potential corporate anti-distortion interest in regulating speech.118
The Court explained what governmental interests may justifiably regu-
late independent expenditures119 and require disclosure.120 The Su-
preme Court restated the fundamental truth that the First
Amendment protects speech, no matter who the speakers are,121 and
therefore, strict scrutiny is required for “[l]aws that burden political
speech.”122
The Court then held that the only permissible interest in restrict-
ing political speech is the anti-corruption interest, which it defined as
the interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption;123 the Court re-
jected all other interests.124 Furthermore, the Court found that, as a
113. The window is thirty days before a primary and sixty days before a general elec-
tion. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i)(II) (2006).
114. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 889–90. For a more detailed explanation of the ap-
peal-to-vote test, see Bopp & Coleson, supra note 7, at 50–51.
115. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
116. Id. (overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)).
117. Id. (overruling portions of McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)).
118. Id. at 904; see Bopp, La Rue & Kosel, supra note 7, at 356–59 (advocating that the
rationale of Citizens United also means that the government cannot ban corporate
contributions).
119. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909–10 (stating that the government’s interest is lim-
ited to preventing quid-pro-quo corruption).
120. The Court made clear that constitutional disclosure requirements are ones that
“do not prevent anyone from speaking.” Id. at 914 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 201)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
121. See id. at 882–83.
122. Id. at 898. Under strict scrutiny, the government must “prove that the restriction
‘furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’” Id. (citing
WRTL-II, 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)).
123. Id. at 901, 909.
124. The rejected interests include (1) preventing corporate “distortion,” id. at 903–05,
(2) preventing influence or access with candidates, id. at 910 (“The fact that speakers may
have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean these officials are corrupt
. . . . The appearance of influence or access . . . will not cause the electorate to lose faith in
our democracy.”), (3) protecting dissenting shareholders, id. at 911, and (4) suppressing
political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity, id. at 913.
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matter of law, “independent expenditures, including those made by
corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of cor-
ruption.”125 Thus, there is no interest in restricting independent ex-
penditures.126 This is true even (and especially) during the pre-
election period: “[I]t is our law and our tradition that more speech,
not less, is the governing rule.”127
Because of the non-corrupting nature of independent expendi-
tures, the government may not prohibit a corporation from making
them out of its general fund, nor require them to employ a separate
segregated fund.128 Separate segregated funds, or PACs,129 are “bur-
densome alternatives” that are “expensive to administer and subject to
extensive regulations.”130 They have “onerous restrictions,” and corpo-
rations may not be able to establish one quickly enough to engage in
vital political speech.131 The holding takes back a class of political
speech from the stifling hands of the bureaucracy: As the Chief Justice
pointed out during oral argument, “we don’t put our First Amend-
ment rights in the hands of . . . bureaucrats.”132
Finally, the Court stated that the mere presence of the corporate
form does not give rise to corruption justifying the disparate treat-
ment.133 “Political speech is ‘indispensable to decision making in a
democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a
corporation rather than an individual.’”134
III. The Mythology of Citizens United
As evidenced from the deluge of criticism and praise after Citizens
United, it may be the most controversial Supreme Court decision in
recent history. However, that honor may not be well-deserved, given
125. Id. at 909.
126. Id. at 913 (holding that “[n]o sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on
the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations”).
127. Id. at 911.
128. Id. at 897–98, 913.
129. See supra note 53.
130. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897.
131. Id. at 898.
132. Transcript of Oral Argument at 66, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)
(No. 08-205), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_tran-
scripts/08-205%5BReargued%5D.pdf.
133. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904–08 (“[T]he First Amendment generally prohibits
the suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s identity.”).
134. Id. at 904 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)).
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that much of the criticism is based on false premises. This Part will
examine five of the most common criticisms of Citizens United.135
A. Myth: “Citizens United Is About Corporate Personhood”
One significant criticism of Citizens United is that it impermissibly
extends certain “individual” rights to corporations.136 But Citizens
United is not about extending rights to corporations (or any
speaker)—it is about preserving existing freedoms. Debating what
rights a corporation may have misses the point. Corporations are as-
sociations of people. And, if those people have the specific freedom to
do something individually, they should have the freedom to pool their
resources and do it together.
So, what Citizens United actually did was reaffirm the freedom to
associate. This freedom is not a new creation; it is “an inseparable
aspect” of the First Amendment and refers to the freedom of individu-
als to form groups in order to “engage in association for the advance-
ment of beliefs and ideas.”137 The Supreme Court has previously held
that “[o]ur form of government is built on the premise that every citi-
zen shall have the right to engage in political expression and associa-
tion. This right was enshrined in the First Amendment of the Bill of
Rights.”138 “The freedom to associate with others for the common ad-
vancement of political beliefs and ideas lies at the heart of the First
Amendment.”139
B. Myth: “Citizens United Benefits the Wealthy”
Critics argue that the Supreme Court’s striking of the corporate
prohibitions benefits the wealthy.140 However, as explained above,
corporations are associations of people. Although wealthy individuals
may choose to associate, it is people of average or less-than-average
means who have to join together in order to have their voices heard.
135. These criticisms are compiled from various sources and presented here in the
abstract.
136. See, e.g., Amanda D. Johnson, Comment, Originalism and Citizens United: The
Struggle of Corporate Personhood, 7 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 187 (2010).
137. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958).
138. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
139. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010).
140. See, e.g., Ron Gettelfinger & Larry Cohen, Why the Citizens United Decision Under-
mines Democracy, HILL (Feb. 2, 2010, 7:42 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/79373-
why-the-citizens-united-decision-undermines-democracy (“[T]his misguided decision poses
a fundamental threat to our democracy and our nation’s ability to pursue policies that will
benefit ordinary Americans, rather than just the wealthy, powerful elites.”).
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By affirming the freedom of association, Citizens United helps average
people engage in political speech and make their political viewpoints
known. While the word “corporation” may conjure up images of
Microsoft and British Petroleum, the truth is that the vast majority of
corporations in the United States are small business corporations or
ideological corporations.141 The freedom of association is essential to
the expression of these people and must withstand changing political
controversy.142
C. Myth: “Citizens United Will Open the Floodgates to Corporate
Interference in Elections”
Many critics claim that Citizens United will be the end of our de-
mocracy as we know it, since corporations will spend millions of dol-
lars to buy elected officials.143 This is a fallacious argument for two
reasons. First, it implies that corporations may give money directly to
candidates. However, corporations remain prohibited from making
contributions to, or coordinating expenditures with, candidates or po-
litical parties. But, even if corporations could make contributions,
such contributions from associations of people would not automatically
jeopardize the integrity of our elections.144
Second, there are practical reasons why most corporations will
not avail themselves of the ability to make independent expenditures.
One reason is the resources needed to comply with the necessary dis-
claimer, disclosure, and reporting requirements.145 Many corpora-
141. Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., http://web.sba.gov/faqs/
faqindex.cfm?areaID=24 (follow “How many small businesses are there?” hyperlink) (last
visited Dec. 7, 2011) (“In 2009, there were 27.5 million businesses in the United States,
according to Office of Advocacy estimates . . . . Small firms with fewer than 500 employees
represent 99.9 percent of the total . . . as the most recent data show there were about
18,311 large businesses in 2007.”).
142. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
143. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Lobbyists Get Potent Weapon in Campaign Financing,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/22donate.
html (“A lobbyist can now tell any elected official: if you vote wrong, my company, labor
union or interest group will spend unlimited sums explicitly advertising against your re-
election.”).
144. Notably, the critics that worry about corporations buying elections and exercising
undue influence over elected officials do not seek measures to weed out those politicians
that would avail themselves of such influence. Yet, “[c]orporate money has no purchasing
power if nothing is for sale.” Matthew A. Melone, Citizens United and Corporate Political
Speech: Did the Supreme Court Enhance Political Discourse or Invite Corruption?, 60 DEPAUL L.
REV. 29, 97 (2010).
145. Navigating the applicable regulations is not for the faint of heart. Once the corpo-
ration hits a specific reporting trigger, for example, the clock begins to run and penalties
will be assessed for noncompliance. And the requirements are likely to get more compli-
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-2\SAN201.txt unknown Seq: 22 14-FEB-12 15:46
302 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
tions simply cannot afford to navigate the regulatory hurdles in order
to make independent expenditures. A second reason is that many cor-
porations do not want to make independent expenditures.146 Many
corporations are comprised of a diverse citizenship, so choosing a
“side” on an issue or candidate may alienate some members. Most cor-
porations also are in business to make a profit, and therefore cannot
afford to alienate customers or encounter negative press.147
Looking at the 2010 election, forecasts regarding Citizen United’s
effect on elections, including “[t]he president’s remarks[,] were not
only factually inaccurate . . . but none of the doomsday predictions
ha[ve] come true. Thanks in significant part to the [Citizens United]
decision, the 2010 elections were the most competitive and issue-ori-
ented in a generation.”148 The Center for Responsive Politics found
that nonparty groups outspent parties on independent expenditures
and electioneering communications in the 2010 midterm election.149
Early reports showed that the speech specifically opened up by Citizen
United’s holding “represented 15 percent of all federal political spend-
ing in 2010.”150 Nevertheless, “[i]n three of the most expensive Senate
cated over time. See Daniel Winik, Note, Citizens Informed: Broader Disclosure and Disclaimer for
Corporate Electoral Advocacy in the Wake of Citizens United, 120 YALE L.J. 622 (2010) (provid-
ing a brief overview of the myriad disclosure and reporting requirements, followed by an
argument for heightened requirements).
146. William T. Allen, Chancellor, Remarks at the Brennan Center for Justice Sympo-
sium: Accountability After Citizens United, Can Shareholders Save Democracy? (Apr. 29,
2011), http://www.brennancenter.org/content/pages/accountability_after_citizens_
united_transcript_section_iii (“[Corporations] don’t want controversy because controversy
is going to signal to the product market who it is and for this reason alone I don’t think
you’re going to see a corporation wanting to involve themselves very much with corporate
funds in political affairs.”).
147. Famously, Target Corporation received significant criticism for its contribution to
a Conservative-leaning PAC supporting the Republican-candidate for Governor of Minne-
sota. Chris Morran, Target Angers Some Gay Customers with Support of Conservative Politician,
CONSUMERIST (July 28, 2010, 10:15 AM), http://consumerist.com/2010/07/target-anger-
ing-gay-customers-with-support-of-conservative-politician.html.
148. Bradley Smith, The Incumbent’s Bane: Citizens United and the 2010 Election, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 25, 2011, at A15 (“Citizens United helped to level, not tilt, the playing field.”).
149. Spencer MacColl, Citizens United Decision Profoundly Affects Political Landscape,
OPENSECRETS.ORG (CENTER RESPONSIVE POL.) (May 5, 2011, 11:16 AM), http://www.open
secrets.org/news/2011/05/citizens-united-decision-profoundly-affects-political-landscape.
html.
150. Beth Fouhy, Anonymous Donors Spent $132M on 2010 Campaign Ads, MSNBC.COM,
Dec. 10, 2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40608858/ns/politics-decision_2010/t/
anonymous-donors-spent-m-campaign-ads/.
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races, candidates won despite a heavy onslaught of Citizens United
spending directed at them.”151
D. Myth: “Citizens United Harms Shareholders”
Critics decry Citizens United as providing a corporation with the
ability to act outside of the wishes of its shareholders.152 This criticism
is misleading because it assumes that a corporation’s Board of Direc-
tors will act in a way that will harm the shareholders. There are various
corporate-law safeguards to assure such things will not happen, in-
cluding the election-and-removal process for the Board of Direc-
tors.153 This criticism is also unfounded because it suggests that First
Amendment jurisprudence is the best avenue to handle corporate
shareholder issues. If, as an unintended consequence, shareholders
are weakened by the Court’s ruling in Citizens United, the proper solu-
tion would be to seek a solution through the existing corporate regu-
lations, rather than restricting speech.154
151. Id.; see also MacColl, supra note 149 (“Corporations generally did not directly get
involved in political spending but rather donated more than $15 million to a new type of
political group known as a ‘super PAC’.”). “Super PAC” refers to a political action commit-
tee that only makes independent expenditures. The term gained notoriety when Comedy
Central’s pundit, Stephen Colbert, created the “Colbert Super PAC” and discussed the
issues on the air. See Dan Eggen, Colbert Announces a ‘Super PAC,’ WASH. POST POL. & POL’Y
BLOG (April 15, 2011, 12:59 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/44/post/col-
bert-announces-a-super-pac/2011/04/15/AFZCBYjD_blog.html; Danny Yadron, Stephen
Colbert: Fund-Raising or Fun-Raising?, WALL ST. J. WASH. WIRE BLOG (May 13, 2011, 2:35 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/05/13/stephen-colbert-fund-raising-or-fun-raising/.
152. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Corporate Governance and Corporate Political Activity: What
Effect Will Citizens United Have on Shareholder Wealth? 1 (Harv. L. & Econ., Discussion Paper
No. 684, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1680861.
153. Robert Jackson, Professor, Columbia Law Sch., Remarks at the Brennan Center
for Justice Symposium: Accountability After Citizens United, Can Shareholders Save Democ-
racy? (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.brennancenter.org/content/pages/accountability_after
_citizens_united_transcript_section_iii (“[W]hat Citizens United doesn’t say is how corpora-
tions decide whether or not to use this [political] power, and how it will be used if they do
. . . . [I]f shareholders don’t like what directors are doing they can simply throw them out
over time.”).
154. Andy Kroll, Citizens United: The Shareholders Strike Back, MOTHER JONES (June 1,
2011), http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/05/citizens-united-home-depot-elections
(“[S]hareholders of Home Depot . . . will have their own chance to chip away at Citizens
United when they vote on a strongly worded resolution urging the company to disclose all
political campaign spending . . . to elect or defeat candidates running for office. The reso-
lution would give shareholders the chance to vote for or against Home Depot’s campaign
contributions.”).
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E. Myth: “Citizens United Encourages/Necessitates Increased
Disclosure”
The Supreme Court did approve certain disclaimer and disclo-
sure requirements in one part of the Citizens United opinion.155 Critics
have responded to this portion of the decision in two broad ways: (1)
by declaring that the Supreme Court has given Congress and the
states a blank check to impose disclosure mechanisms;156 or (2) by
fearing that the Supreme Court has vitiated disclosure and Congress
and the states need to fill in the gaps to save our elections.157
Regarding the first reaction, many states are relying on the Su-
preme Court’s holding regarding the constitutionality of on-ad attri-
bution requirements and simple event-driven reporting158 as a blank
check for overhauling their campaign-finance regimes.159 Pursuant to
this apparent “mandate,” many states are packaging different cam-
paign-finance regulations as “disclosure” even when the regulations
have nothing to do with disclosing relevant information.160
Regarding the second reaction, critics argue that Citizens United
fatally damaged the disclosure regime and immediate action is neces-
sary.161 Many states enacted legislation in a reactionary response to
the decision. Even Congress attempted to fast-track a disclosure bill
(“DISCLOSE”) during the summer of 2010.162 DISCLOSE attempted
155. See supra Part II.
156. See, e.g., Ryan J. Reilly, FEC Chair: ‘We Can Be Doing More on Disclosure’ After Citizens
United, TPMMUCKRAKER (June 9, 2011, 3:07 PM), http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpoints
memo.com/2011/06/fec_chair_we_can_be_doing_more_on_disclosure.php.
157. See, e.g., Paul Blumenthal, Post-Citizens United Disclosure Is Down Significantly, SUN-
LIGHT FOUND. (Sept. 20, 2010, 11:08 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2010/09/
20/post-citizens-united-disclosure-is-down-significantly.
158. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010). There is a distinction between
on-ad attribution and event-driven reporting, which the Court found to be permissible,
and the PAC-style disclosure, which (for these groups) the Court found not permissible. Id.
at 898, 913.
159. For a comprehensive overview of the state laws affected by, and the states that
have responded to, the decision, see Life After Citizens United, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLA-
TURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19607 (last updated Jan. 4, 2011).
160. See, e.g., Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 640 F.3d 304, 321
(8th Cir. 2011), vacated and reh’g en banc granted (8th Cir. July 12, 2011) (Riley, C.J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (“[C]ertain requirements Minnesota imposes on corpo-
rations have nothing or very little to do with disclosure.”).
161. See supra note 157.
162. See Press Release, Congressman Chris Van Hollen, Van Hollen, Castle, Jones,
Brady Announce DISCLOSE Act to Address Citizens United Ruling (April 29, 2010), avail-
able at http://vanhollen.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=183368.
The Bill passed in the House but could not get the necessary votes in the Senate. In 2011,
Representative Van Hollen  sued the FEC over the current disclosure regulations. Press
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to cast a wide net, sweeping in many different activities in response to
Citizens United (including activities outside the scope of the case).
However, these responses fail to see what the Court in Citizens
United actually did. The Court expressly approved the federal scheme
of simple, event-driven reporting of electioneering communica-
tions.163 In so doing, the Court did not make a blanket statement re-
garding the constitutionality of all disclosure laws.164 Instead, it
applied exacting scrutiny to those requirements and found that those
requirements were constitutional.165 The Court applied strict scrutiny
to the significantly more burdensome PAC-style restrictions and found
those to be unconstitutional.166 It is going too far to declare that the
Court’s constitutional analysis either endorsed or necessitated height-
ened disclosure.
Conclusion
Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United is
important. However, the reason why it is important is overshadowed
by the fearful rhetoric and misunderstandings by its outspoken critics.
When it decided Citizens United, the Supreme Court was not advancing
corporate personhood or attempting to corrupt our elections; it was
reinforcing the freedom of speech.
Like WRTL-II, Citizens United is but a step towards reclaiming es-
sential First Amendment freedoms. The United States has “a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”167 It is the Su-
preme Court’s job to protect that freedom.
Release, Congressman Chris Van Hollen, Van Hollen Files Lawsuit Challenging FEC Regu-
lations (April 21, 2011), available at http://vanhollen.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.
aspx?DocumentID=237989.
163. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct at 913–16.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Snyder v. Phelps, 131
S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011).
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